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In developing an information systems (IS), most 
organizations have preferred a traditional add-on 
approach that adds commercial security products after an 
IS development project is finished. However, a number of 
recent incidents with regard to IS security indicate that 
this approach does not guarantee IS security because 
commercial products are not designed for the specific 
organizational IS environments. As an alternative 
solution, previous studies suggested that organizations 
integrate both the security engineering (SE) process and 
software development lifecycle (SDLC) process 
standards. Unfortunately, a few studies tried to suggest 
the limited integration models. In this paper, as a practical 
way for the development of secure IS, we suggest two SE 
process models. First, we develop the generalized SE 
model that includes all SE activities through the whole 
SDLC. Secondly, we suggest the process integration 
model that interweaves SE with IEEE/EIA 12207 through 




Although today’s businesses highly depend on 
information systems, most organizations still do not 
consider IS security an important issue (e.g., Straub and 
Welke, 1998). Further, managers think that the investment 
in IS security is an overhead with "intangible benefit" 
(Piper, 1994) and including a SE process into SDLC 
might cause performance loss, inflexibility, and higher 
cost, and then they prefer the add-on approach that adds 
commercial security products after the system 
development is completed. However, this add-on 
approach does not guarantee to effectively protect IS, 
because the commercial security products developed for a 
general purpose are not designed to meet inherent 
requirements of each organization which has an 
inherently unique IS environment (Tettero et al., 1997). 
Due to this weakness of the add-on approach, many 
security incidents have repeatedly occurred (e.g., 
Shimeall and McDermott, 1999).   
For the solution to developing a more secure system, 
studies have asserted that SE process be regarded as an 
important issue from the very beginning of system 
development projects and further be integrated into the 
whole processes of general system development 
(Baskerville, 1993; Booysen and Eloff, 1995; Marshall et 
al., 1995; Mostert and Solms, 1994). SE process is 
defined as  "a set of activities to gain understanding of the 
security risks, establish a balanced set of security needs in 
according to identified risks, transform security needs into 
security functions, establish assurance in the correctness 
or effectiveness of security mechanism, determine that 
operational impacts due to residual security vulnerabilities 
in a system or its operation is tolerable, and integrate the 
efforts of all engineering disciplines"(SSECMM 
1999:26). Booysen and Eloff (1995) suggested that SE 
activities be integrated into the initial design of an IS to 
achieve the better security. Baskerville (1993) also stated 
that the separation of security function from systems 
designs cause the unsecured system, because each of 
security designer and general function designer develops 
the systems based on its own focus. Mostert and Solms 
(1994) asserted that add-on approach costs ten times more 
than the SE approach that integrates SE process into 
software lifecycle process standard. SE process activities 
defined by the previous studies are summarized in Table 
1.  
However, the previous studies have several limitations 
to be generally applied in the real world. At first, they 
were not based on the generalized system development 
process in that they developed under specific application 
domain or specific theoretical backgrounds. For example, 
common criteria (CC) come from secure product 
evaluation, while system security engineering capability 
maturity model (SSE-CMM) from the evaluation of an 
organization's security maturity level (SEI 1997). 
Therefore, their activities differ from each other. Second, 
they generally did not consider the integration of the SE 
process into software lifecycle process standard, even 
though some studies (e.g., Tompkins and Rice, 1986, 
Marshall et al., 1995) attempted to consider it based on 
the specific standards (e.g., Mil-Std-2167A). It gives the 
difficulty to the acquirers because they do not have 
enough SE knowledge to suggest the exact security 
requirements and manage and control the project 
efficiently. Developers also experience a difficulty 
because they have been involved in IS projects that 
require a small number of security functions. This 




Table. 1 The Previous Researches Dealing With SE process activities 
 
RESEARCH SE PROCESS ACTIVITIES 
TCSEC  
(1985) 
Audit, Trusted Path, System Architecture, System Integrity, Security Testing, Design Spec. and 
Verification, Covert Channel Analysis, Trusted Facility Mgt, Configuration Mgt, Trusted Recovery, 
Trusted Distribution, and Documentations 
Tompkins & 
Rice (1986) 
Sensitivity Determination, Security Objective, Security Risks Assessment, Security Feasibility Study, 
Security Requirement Analysis, Security Test Plan Development, Security Specifications Design, 
Security Test Procedures Development, Security Relevant Code Writing, Documentation, Security 
Test & Evaluation, Security Test Analysis & Certification Report 
Badenhorst & 
Eloff (1989) 
Top Manager's Computer Security Awareness and Support, SE Steering Committee Appointment, 
Security Policy Establishments, The Scope of Security Definition, Risk Analysis, Technical Security 
Measures' Installation, Detection, On-going Security Administration, Documentation and Reports, 
Training, Security Auditing, Change Control 
Weiss (1991) 
Baseline Architecture Identification, Threat Identification, Threat Analysis and Decomposition, Risk 
Assessment, Prioritization of Vulnerabilities, Identification of Candidate Safeguards, Safeguard Trade-
off Analysis, Security Architecture Selection, Security Architecture Integration and Iteration 
Bodeau (1994) 
Security Requirement Analysis, Identification and Analysis of Functional Flows, Security Test, 
Evaluation, and Transition Plan 
Marshall et.al 
(1995) 
Security Requirements, Security Model, Security Risk and Vulnerability Analysis, Security 
Architecture, DTLS, FTLS, Covert Channel Analysis, Security Testing, Documentation, and 
Certification & Accreditation 
Booysen & Eloff 
(1995) 
Sensitivity Analysis, Security Risk Analysis, Security Prototype, Security Requirement Validation, 
Security Model, Information Flow Analysis, Audit, Design Security Control, Test Safeguards, 
Security Report, Security Documentation 
CC(1996) 
Security Audit, Trusted Path, Development, Testing, Vulnerability Assessment, Configuration 
Management, Lifecycle Support, Guidance Documents, Delivery and Operation 
Tettero et al. 
(1997) 
Security Minds, Security Policy, Security Requirement, Threat Analysis, Description of System 
Environments, Feasibility Analysis, System Specification, Security Framework, Security Component 
Building, Operation and Change Management 
SSE-CMM 
(1997) 
Admin. Sec. Controls, Assess Impact, Assess Security Risk, Assess Threat, Assess Vulnerability, 
Build Assurance Argument, Coordinate Security, Monitor Security Posture, Provide Security Input, 
Specify Security Needs, Verify and Validate Security 
 
Figure 1. Problems Related to SE 
 
Therefore, both of them require the general guideline 
for the development of secure systems.  
To meet this requirement, in this paper, we address 
two models of SE process.  First, we introduce the 
generalized SE process model that integrates all of SE 
activities into the whole processes of SDLC. It is not the 
new one, but the result of analyzing and regrouping SE 
activities of previous studies and conducting the 
interviews with IS experts. Second, based on this 
generalized model, we suggest the process integration 
model that incorporates SE process with IEEE/EIA 
12207. The model suggests the way to connect SE 
activities to software lifecycle process and its lifecycle 
data.  
 
SE Process Model   
 
We first developed the process model consisting of 
twenty-five activities based on the previous research, and 
then performed the interview with nine IS experts and 
asked for the appropriateness of the new model. There 
were several different opinions about the model. One of 
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the big issues was about the level of details related to SE 
process activities. Most interviewees agreed to the 
detailed classification, while the others wanted to reduce 
the number of activities. Specially, two experts wanted to 
reduce SE activities. Security management was pointed 
out by most of interviewees that consider it an important 
issue for the flexible communication medium between 
acquirers and developers during SDLC. They mentioned 
the building of the special team for SE to support this 
activity. On the contrary to our expectation, the experts 
mainly emphasized the managerial issues, such as security 
management, managerial support, and training. As a result 
of the interview, we modified the previous model, added 
four activities, merged two activities, and removed two 
activities. The newly added activities are managerial 
support, building security management team, user 
trainings, and fault analysis and fixing. Security model 
and architecture design, and security operation concept 
and scenario description are merged into one, while 
security objective and contingency planning are removed. 
Figure 2 shows SE process model, including the feedback 
mechanism, and Table 2 summarizes SE process 
activities.  
 
Figure 2. SE Process Model  
 
SE Process Integration Model  
 
Based on SE model, we suggested the process 
integration model of SE process activities with IEEE/EIA 
12207. For the integration, we adopt IEEE/EIA 12207 as 
a software lifecycle process standard since it has been 
used as a standard of both industry and military software 
development projects (IEEE 1998). It defines the role of 
acquirer, supplier, developer, operator and maintainer 
during SDLC and gives the guideline of processes and 
outputs for software development. Lifecycle processes of 
IEEE/EIA 12207 consist of five primary, eight 
organizational, and four supporting processes. And its 
lifecycle data consist of eighty-four items including thirty 
primary components.  
We tried to integrate SE process into IEEE/EIA 12207 
in two areas. One is to connect SE process activities to 
software lifecycle process activities and the other is to 
interrelate SE process to lifecycle data. The former is 
important in the view of combining general software 
development process with SE process, and the latter is 
important in the view of designating the right place to 
store outputs of SE process activities. Higginbotham and 
Maley (1998) suggested the purpose of the integration "by 
integrating security engineering process into system 
development, system developers can satisfy the acquirer's 
concern and the acquirer can satisfy about the quality of 




To develop a process integration model, we performed 
two-stage Delphi analysis. Delphi analysis is a useful tool 
when judgment from experts is inevitable (Rowe et al 
1991). We carefully selected the experts who have 
experiences on secure system development. This analysis 
was conducted with thirty-three IS experts consisting of 
five security experts, six system designers, thirteen 
system developers, and nine project managers. They 
turned out to have 5.1 years' field experience, and 2.2 
times experience of secure system development in 
average. This analysis was a two-stage iterative process. 
Before we started the 1st stage analysis, we met and 
explained the purpose of our research and handed out a 
questionnaire and a form with several materials to help 
their understanding (i.e., summary about both SE and 
IEEE/EIA 12207). The form is for describing problem 
suggestions about the integration. In the middle of the 
questionnaire, we asserted the pictures that consist of SE 
activities, IEEE/EIA 12207's primary process activities 
and lifecycle data. Each expert then drew the line to show 
their opinions about the relationship among them, and 
expressed the appropriateness of connection using three-
point Likert-style scales that contain one meaning a 'weak' 
relationship and three meaning a 'strong' relationship.  
 
The Results of Delphi Analysis 
 
After conducting the first stage, we calculated the 
weighted average of the measures. We also gathered and 
analyzed forms from experts. Based on these analyses, we 
could find three main things. One was to include the 
supporting and organizational process in this model. The 
previous questionnaire only included primary processes of 
IEEE/EIA 12207. Instead of drawing the line between SE 
activities and primary process activities, twenty-one 
experts suggested incorporating these two processes with 
primary process at the form. The other issue was security 
management. Security experts and project managers 
showed their strong interest in security management and  
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Top manager & 
Employee Support 
and Involvement 
Continuous support and active involvement on the project. It helps to raise 
security awareness and knowledge and the streamlined secure system 
development with responsibility.   
RFP Descriptions 
Compose RFP about security function by security managers integrating the inf. of 
several sources such as security experts.  
Proposal Evaluation 
Evaluate proposals in the view of meeting security requirements, economical, and 
technological feasibility to choose the most appropriate developer 
Security Team 
Building 
Build the specialized security team which mainly takes a responsibility about all 







Define the collections of rules to protect, distribute, and control the important 
electronic assets which will be physically implemented as security functions 
User & Developer 
Training 
Perform user training to give information about the objective, and general views 
on the planned system & developer training to give the exact understanding on the 
user security requirements 
Security Requirement 
Analysis 
Collect security requirements of the users about the target system and analyze 
them, adding security managers own security knowledge 
Risk analysis 
Identify the possible threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the system’s 





Develop sec. operation concepts that explain how system is implemented to meet 
sec. requirements well, and develop the scenario that gives the developer tangible 
information about diverse threats and vulnerability of the system  
Security Model & 
Security Architecture 
Development 
Analyze secure information flow by grouping objects, specifying their 
interdependencies, and illustrating the interactions. The top-level in that structure 
becomes a logical component by system architects, while the bottom-level 
becomes a physical component to be practically implemented 
Security Spec. Desc. Describe the specification based on outputs of security design process activity.   
Security Prototype 
Development 
Develop the program that consists of critical function of the completed system for 
verifying the appropriateness of the design for security requirements. 
Coding Convert the physical design into programming code 
Covert Channel Anal. Perform trials for finding secret channel 
System Integration Integrate the developed security functions with the designated hardware device 
Functional Test 
Perform functional, operational, verification, and penetration testing to evaluate 




Security Report Desc. 
Records the findings and results from tests, including security defects, the 
measures for improving them, and the results from applying the measures. 
Secure Distribution 
Channel Plan 
Make a plan to distribute to the users' sites through physical and managerial 
channels and maintain the continuous reliable channels 
Oper. Test & Modif. Test the developed system at the real org. environment and find/fix the problems 
Documentation 
Develop security related documents including user manual, trusted facility 
manual, test documentation, design documentation and security module code 
Configuration 
Management 
Conduct configuration management which continuously observes the changes in 
information systems and promptly modifies the factors of changes 
Fault Analysis & Fix 
Find and fix system defects that occur due to unclear procedures, invasion, and 
design problems.   





Perform auditing for identifying sec. policy violations that can happen in the 
operational processes 
Security Management 
Manage all of managerial problems occurred during the SDLC, and resolves them 
through mediating with supplier, system developer, operator and maintainer 
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allocated it into a number of IEEE/EIA 12207 process 
activities. This activity has been strongly emphasized on 
SE studies (e.g., James 1996). The last issue was the 
documentation. Project managers mainly indicated no 
existence of the appropriate data items in which SE 
activities are stored. For example, they did not mark the 
connection between SE process activities and lifecycle 
data in acquisition and supply processes and attached a 
comment about its inappropriateness. They also 
recommended the addition of four lifecycle data to the 
last two processes. Based on their suggestions and the 
analysis result, we developed the initial integration model. 
After that, we performed the second Delphi analysis. The 
analysis drew more agreements than the first one. The 
mean of weighted average increased from 2.34 to 2.51 in 
the case of the connection between both process activities, 
and from 2.41 to 2.49 in the case of the connection 
between process activities and lifecycle data. In addition, 
the standard deviation of weighted average decreased 
from 0.34 to 0.27 in the former connection, and from 0.30 
to 0.26 in the latter one. However, two augmented issues 
in the 1st analysis still remained in disagreement (low 
scores) though their gap becomes narrowed. The 
distinguished feature of the second analysis was 
documentation. It mainly came from project managers. 
After comparing to the suggestion of the first stage that 
required the addition to several lifecycle data, they 
recommended that the addition decision of the documents  
remain as negotiated issues during the contract period. 
The detailed results of the analysis are shown in Table 3 
and Figure 3, 4, and 5. The table shows that the lowest 
and the highest scored items in 1st and 2nd analysis. The 
mean and standard deviation value show that the result of 
2nd stage has better homogeneity than that of 1st stage.  
 
Acquisition and Supply Process 
 
As shown in Figure 3, although most of components 
in these processes incorporated with one another, there 
existed three problems. One is security policy. Security 
policy was not strongly connected with the lifecycle 
process activities and data of IEEE/EIA 12207. Another is 
security management. We connected it to too many 
activities of IEEE/EIA 12207 processes (i.e., supplier 
monitoring, acceptance and completions). The other was 
that three SE process activities were allocated into 
acquisition plan, though they are not well matched. These 
problems are remained as negotiation subjects of the 
contract for secure system development.  
 
Table 3. Results of Delphi Analysis (1st and 2nd Analysis) 
 
SE vs. Lifecycle process activities 1st 2nd SE Activities vs. Lifecycle Data 1st 2nd 
Lowest Scores (Below 2.0) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis Lowest Scores (Below 2.0) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis 
Managerial Support-Contract Prep. Update 1.7  Managerial Support-Acquisition Plan 1.6 1.7 
Sec. Team Building-Initiation 1.7  RFP Prep.-Acquisition Plan 1.8 1.9 
Sec. Policy Enforcement-Initialization 1.9 2.0 RFP Prep.-Acceptance Strategy & Cond. 
Records 
1.9  
Sec. Policy Enf.-Contract Prep.& Update 1.5 1.8 Sec. Policy Enforcement-Acquisition Plan 1.8 1.8 
Sec. Mgt.- Review & Evaluation  1.9  User & Developer Training-Develop. Process 
Plan 
2.0  
Risk Analysis-Management  2.0    
Sec. Testing-Verification  2.0    
Highest Scores (Upper 2.8) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis Highest Scores (Upper 2.8) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis 
Sec. Module Coding-S/W Coding & 
Testing 
2.9 2.9 Sec. Oper. Con. & Sce. Desc.-Con. of Oper. 
Desc. 
 2.8 
Sec. System Integration-S/W Integration 2.8 2.9 Sec. Model & Arch. Design-S/W Arch. Desc. 2.8 2.8 
Sec. Testing-S/W Coding & Testing 2.8  Sec. Module Coding-Source & Executable Obj. 
Code Records 
 2.8 
Sec. Testing (Operational)-Validation 2.8  Sec. Sys. Integration-S/W Integration Plan 2.9 2.9 
Sec. Req. Anal.-System Req. Anal.   2.9 Documentation-User Documentation Desc.  2.8 
Sec. Req. Anal.-S/W Req. Anal.  2.9 Sec. Audit-Audit Agenda Record & Proc. 2.8 2.9 
Secure Distribution Channel Plan-Infra.  2.9    
Documentation-Documentation  2.9    
Configuration Mgt.-Configuration Mgt.  2.9    
Operational Training-Training  3.0    
Sec. Mgt.-Mgt.  2.9    
Total Average Mean  2.34 2.51  2.41 2.49 
Standard Dev. 0.34 0.27  0.30 0.26 
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Figure 3 Process Integration Model- Acquisition and 
Supply Process 
 






In this process, while most components are well 
matched with one another, there were some components 
that need to be integrated with supporting and 
organizational process. For example, functional test was 
interconnected with quality assurance and verification 
activities, and security reports are combined with joint 
review, problem resolution, and improvement. Risk 
analysis was another issue. We connected it with 
system/software requirement analysis and management, 
and with the concept of operations and system/software 
requirement description, but it did not cover all of the 
scope of risk analysis. As an alternative, we suggest that 
risk analysis perform its functions with other process 
activities, such as management and configuration 
management.  
 
Operation and Management Process 
 
In these processes, with the primary lifecycle process 
activity, supporting and organizational process activities 
assist SE process. For example, the security documents 
are integrated with documentation activity in supporting 
process, while secure distribution channel are with 
infrastructure in organizational process. We incorporated 
four lifecycle data that are not primary data into this 
model. For instance, modification request and records, 
test or validation plan, procedures and results reports, and 
audit agenda record and procedure.  
 






Although we developed the process improvement 
models for secure system development, they have several 
limitations addressed.  First, the model was not yet to be 
applied to the real situation. Although we used Delphi 
analysis to preserve the objectiveness of the models, they 
could not prove their effectiveness in practice. Therefore, 
we need to perform the case study for applying these 
models to software development projects.  Second, it  
does not include the tailoring guide that shows the 
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guideline how to tailor the model based on the size, 
security requirement levels, budget or periods of the 
project, and each industrial characteristics. And the last 
since we used the simple weighted average to compute 
the appropriateness of each mapping scheme, we could 
not reflect the different viewpoint of each party of Delphi 
analysis into the model. For example, security engineers 
gives high points to managerial side SE activities, while 
system engineers gives to the design and implementation 
side activities. These issues are remained as future 




In this paper, we addressed the SE model and process 
integration model with IEEE/EIA 12207. We suggested a 
SE model that consists of twenty-five SE process 
activities identified by the previous researches and 
interviews. Also we derived the process integration model 
that interrelates SE process activities to IEEE/EIA 12207 
based on Delphi analysis. We expect our models to 
contribute to showing how SE process activities can be 
incorporated into software lifecycle process, and 
providing efficient and effective process enhancement 
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